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ENRON AND THE NECESSITY OF THE
OBJECTIVE PROXIMATE MONITOR
Charles M. Elsont
The bankruptcy of the famed Enron Corporation was not only a
seminal business event, as such a large and well-positioned company
rarely fails, but also a watershed event in American corporate law and
governance that has inspired numerous reforms in the corporate legal
and regulatory regimes. The key question, critical to understanding
the reforms demanded and enacted, is why did this company collapse?
More specifically, who is responsible for this failure, and what could
have been done to avoid it?
A number of commentators in this Symposium have concen-
trated on the failures of the gatekeepers-objective monitors such as
the auditors, rating agencies, and investment analysts-who may have
acquiesced in, done little to prevent, or even missed the problematic
management activities that led to Enron's collapse.1 These commen-
tators have suggested that reform targeting the conduct and structure
of these gatekeepers is necessary both to prevent a repeat of Enron
and to restore public confidence in our financial markets. 2 I cannot
quibble with much of this argument. Clearly, these "gatekeepers" or
"objective monitors," as Professors Coffee and Macey alternately de-
scribe them,3 failed miserably in their responsibilities. They were ei-
ther incredibly negligent or sufficiently co-opted by Enron's
management that they lost all objectivity and efficacy.
While I agree with my colleagues as to the nature of the problem,
I disagree as to precisely where the focus of reform should lie. For
instance, Professor Macey explores what he believes is a tradeoff be-
tween proximity and objectivity. 4 His premise is that directors who
t Charles M. Elson is the Edgar S. Woolard, Jr., Chair in Corporate Governance and
the Director of the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance at the Lerner
College of Business and Economics at the University of Delaware. The author wishes to
thank Christopher Gyves, Wake Forest University School of Law and Babcock Graduate
School of Management, J.D./M.B.A. Class of 2004, for his excellent assistance on this
project.
I SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the
1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004); Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corpo-
rate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 394 (2004).
2 See Coffee, supra note 1, at 303-07; Macey, supra note 1, at 420-22.
3 Compare Coffee, supra note 1, at 279-87 (describing the role of corporate gatekeep-
ers during the 1990s), with Macey, supra note 1, at 399-400 (describing the different types
of objective monitors and their roles).
4 Macey, supra note 1, at 400.
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are in close proximity to corporate management cannot be truly ob-
jective. 5 The implication is that reformers must focus on the objectiv-
ity of those who are not proximate-the outside monitors.6 I cannot
accept this premise. I believe that while active, nonproximate
monitors may be helpful, the real key to the prevention of Enron-type
scandals centers on the proximate monitors, namely, the company's
directors. As corporate insiders, they are in the best position to ob-
serve the activities of corporate management. The secret lies in mak-
ing them more objective and engaged monitors.
An examination of classical corporate governance theory is help-
ful in understanding how directors can be made more objective and
engaged. Under traditional theory, the board acts as an active man-
agement monitor for shareholder benefit.7 Not only must the board
decide when to engage and when to terminate a management team,
but it must also oversee and review management activity between
these two points. The goal of board oversight is to make company
management accountable and, thus, more effective."
The concepts of independence and equity are central to active
monitoring.9 To fulfill their oversight responsibilities effectively, di-
rectors must be independent of management and must hold a person-
ally meaningful equity stake in the enterprise. 10 Independence
involves the absence of any economic ties, either to management or to
the company itself, other than equity ownership. It provides a direc-
tor with the distance and objectivity necessary to examine manage-
ment action in the most effective manner." Economic relationships
5 See id. at 399.
6 See id. at 399-400.
7 See Charles M. Elson et al., Corporate Governance Reform and Reemergence from Bank-
ruptcy: Putting the Structure Back in Restructuring, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1917, 1922 (2002).
8 See id.
9 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, 'Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Share-
holder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDozo L. REV. 511, 521 (1997)
("[D]irector independence has become the mantra of corporate governance reformers.
. .."); Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L.
REv. 325, 340-1 (2001) (noting that in the two decades following the NYSE's adoption of a
rule requiring its members to have an independent audit committee, "the mantra that a
board of directors should be composed of persons independent of management was
spread around the world by regulators and institutional investors"); Claudia H. Deutsch,
The Revolution That Wasn't, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, § 3, at 1 ("[1993,] the so-called Year of
the Sharp Knives... [was to usher in] a new era, one in which directors would act solely in
the interests of shareholders.").
10 The interests of shareowners are properly served only when a "strong, diligent and
independent board of directors ... asks management the tough questions . . . ." THE
CONFERENCE BD. COMM'N ON PUB. TRUST & PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONs 6 (Pt. 2) (2003); see also Am. BAR ASS'N, REP. OF THE Am. BAR Ass'N TASK FORCE ON
CORP. REsp. 31 (2003), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/final_re
port.pdf [hereinafter ABA REPORT] (noting that boards need to engage in more "active,
independent, and informed, oversight").
11 See Elson, supra note 7, at 1922.
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with management, including consulting, service provision, or other in-
direct arrangements, may cloud a director's judgment and make it
more difficult to review management conduct objectively. 12 A lack of
independence can lead to ineffective monitoring if, for example, it
makes a director too comfortable with management and its represen-
tations or places her in such a close relationship with management
that she cannot effectively disengage herself in order to review man-
agement conduct objectively. Keeping directors distanced from com-
pany management allows them to conduct the reflective review of
management practices that public shareholders expect and that is
necessary to long-term corporate success.
Director independence is also important because of its impact on
management activity. Insofar as management is concerned, director
independence brings accountability and responsibility. Responsibility
to a watchful intermediary will likely spur thoughtful decisionmaking
and reflection on management's part.13 These results will not occur
unless the intermediary is in fact independent of the examined
party, 14 thus making board independence a critical component of
modern governance theory.
Coincident and complementary to its emphasis on director inde-
pendence, modern corporate governance theory also stresses the
need for directors to hold an equity stake in the corporation.' 5 While
director independence promotes objectivity, the requirement that
board members maintain equity ownership in the corporation gives
the directors an incentive to exercise their objectivity effectively.'
6
When management appoints the board of directors, and these direc-
tors have no stake in the corporate enterprise other than their board
seats, the directors simply have no pecuniary incentive to actively
monitor management. 17 When directors shirk their duty to monitor
management, stockholder interests are left unprotected. The most ef-
fective incentive for directors to address their responsibilities to the
shareholders is to make them stockholders as well.' 8 By becoming eq-
12 See NAT'L ASS'N CORP. DIR., REP. OF THE NACD BLUE RIBBON COMM'N ON DIR. PRO-
FESSIONALISM 10 (1996) [hereinafter NACD REPORT] (noting that independence means no
consulting arrangements, no business connections, and no service provision to the
company).
13 See Elson, supra note 7, at 1922.
14 See id.
15 See Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C. L.
REv. 937, 981-83 (1993).
16 See id. at 982.
17 Id. at 981-83.
18 See NACD REPORT, supra note 12, at 5 (stating that directors should personally in-
vest a meaningful amount in company stock so that director interests are decoupled from
managerial interests and aligned with those of the shareholders); Elson, supra note 15, at
994-95 (observing that directors with equity ownership interests tend to exercise more
effective oversight); Ellen Taylor, Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: Rethinking Section 16, 39
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uity holders, the outside directors assume a personal stake in the suc-
cess or failure of the enterprise.
Of course, when stock ownership is insubstantial in comparison
to the other private benefits associated with being a director, the moti-
vational impact is bound to be minimal. For example, while the
outside directors of many large corporations often have a nominal eq-
uity stake in the company, they typically receive far more substantial
compensation in the form of annual fees. 19 Such a compensation sys-
tem is a wholly inadequate way to provide the kinds of personal incen-
tives necessary to create an active board. The best way to align
director and shareholder interests and to promote effective monitor-
ing is to pay director fees primarily in the form of restricted company
stock.
It is important to note that while equity ownership provides the
incentive to monitor, it alone does not provide the proper objectivity
to foster effective oversight. Independence creates this objectivity,
and that is why modern governance theory demands both equity own-
ership and independence. Independent directors without equity own-
ership may be objective, but they have little incentive to engage in
active oversight. Equity ownership provides the incentive to exercise
objective oversight. On the other hand, equity-holding directors who
are not independent may have the proper incentive but lack the nec-
essary objectivity. Independence and equity ownership, acting in tan-
dem, are the keys to effective corporate governance.
But how does this emphasis on director independence and equity
relate to the board failure at Enron? The answer is straightforward:
the Enron directors lacked independence from management. 20 They
may have held company equity, but without the appropriate indepen-
dence from Enron management, they lacked the objectivity needed to
perceive the numerous and significant warning signs that should have
alerted them to the alleged management malfeasance that led to the
company's ultimate meltdown and failure.
Five specific signals should have induced greater board probing
of management initiatives. Of these signals, the primary two con-
ARiz. L. Rav. 1315, 1348 (noting that "[miany companies use stock options as incentive
compensation for their employees and directors.... to align their incentives with those of
the other shareholders and thereby encourage them to work harder to make the company
profitable").
19 See Pearl Meyer, Board Stock Ownership: More, and More Again, DIRS. & BDS., Winter
1998, at 55, 55-56 (describing how the approach to director pay has changed dramatically
over the past few years and noting that directors in many large corporations often receive
more than $90,000 per annum for attending a few board meetings).
20 See Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons from A Perfect Storm of Finan-
cial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 163, 199-
201 (2003) (detailing the conflicts of interest of the various Enron board members and
noting that these conflicts contributed to Enron's collapse).
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cerned management's activities. The first involved management's re-
quest, on two specific occasions, that the board waive the company's
code of ethics prohibiting officer conflict-of-interest transactions.
21
The now infamous waivers allowed the debt-shifting, off-balance-sheet
transactions that were allegedly designed to mask the company's pre-
carious financial situation.22 The second warning signal involved mas-
sive sales of company stock by numerous high-level insiders. 23
Management stock sales are never viewed as a good sign of the com-
pany's future prospects, 24 and they should have alerted the board to
potential problems.
The third, fourth, and fifth signals involved the company's audi-
tors, Arthur Andersen. Enron initially engaged Andersen as its exter-
nal auditor. However, this role expanded dramatically over time.
Operating in a climate in which numerous authorities, including the
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, were calling
for substantial reform of the auditor/company relationship, Enron's
relationship with Andersen was problematic in several respects. First,
in addition to providing external auditing services, Andersen also
served as the company's internal auditor. 25 Using a single company to
execute both the internal and external audits generally encountered
great criticism, as many thought that comingling these two oversight
responsibilities would compromise the effectiveness of each. 26 Sec-
ond, while acting as the company's auditor, Andersen provided sub-
stantial consulting services to Enron. 27 In 2001 alone, Andersen billed
approximately $27 million just for its consulting activities. 28 By this
time, this sort of auditor/client consulting relationship was coming
under increasing attack, as critics argued that it would compromise
audits. 29 Finally, senior members of the Enron finance department
21 See STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF TH4E SENATE COMM. ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFF., 10
7
TH CONG., THE ROLE OF THE BD. OF DiRs. IN ENRON'S COLLAPSE 23
(Comm. Print 2002) [hereinafter ROLE OF DIRECTORS REPORT].
22 See id. at 24-28.
23 See Sharon Reece, Enron: The Final Straw & How To Build Pensions of Brick, 41 DUQ.
L. REv. 69, 97 (2002).
24 Charles M. Elson, A Commitment of Time and Financial Capital, DiRs. & BDS., Summer
2002, at 19; see also Melita Marie Garza, 7 Enron Execs Made Millions from Stock, CHI. TIB.,
Jan. 24, 2002, at 1 (noting that high-volume selling by management generally indicates
deepseated problems in a company).
25 See ROLE OF DIRECTORS REPORT, supra note 21, at 53-54.
26 Id. at 54.
27 ENRON CORP., PROXY STATEMENT 14-15 (Mar. 27, 2001) [hereinafter PROXY STATE-
MENT]; see also WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 3-5, at http://
news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/sicreport/sicreport02OlO2.pdf (Feb. 1, 2002) (de-
tailing Andersen's "extensive participation" in several Enron transactions).
28 PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 27, at 14.
29 See ROLE OF DIRECTORS REPORT, supra note 21, at 53-54.
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had been hired directly from Arthur Andersen.30 This practice was
problematic as well because the relationship between former and pre-
sent firm employees had the potential to create unwelcome pressure
on the external auditor.
31
It is difficult to conceive how the highly respected, intelligent,
and influential Enron board could have missed all five of these warn-
ing signals. Had the directors asked questions about these actions,
they might have been able to discover and respond to the manage-
ment misdeeds that hastened the company's collapse. What went
wrong? Simply stated, the directors lacked the appropriate indepen-
dence from management. As a result, they did not have the objectivity
to appreciate the severity of the warnings they were receiving, and
they became ineffective proximate monitors.
Despite the fact that they were technically outsiders and not full-
time company employees, a large number of Enron directors still had
numerous financial or quasi-financial relationships with the company
and its management. For example, several directors had direct con-
sulting relationships with the company for which they were well com-
pensated. 32 Others were officers of charitable organizations that were
the beneficiaries of significant donations from either Enron itself or
members of company management. 33 Still others had business deal-
ings with the company.34 A few had been directors for so many years
that their board seats appeared to have become company-sponsored
sinecures.35 Interestingly enough, most of these directors would have
been considered independent under then-existing Securities and Ex-
change Commission or New York Stock Exchange requirements. 3
6
However, these directors were not in fact independent, at least
not in the sense that corporate governance theorists would consider
appropriate. Most theorists would consider an independent director
to be someone who has no significant direct or indirect financial rela-
tionships with the company or its management. 37 The problem with
these types of relationships is that they compromise the director's ob-
jectivity. They create a bond with company management that makes it
more difficult to review management's actions objectively and dispas-
sionately. That is likely what happened to the Enron directors; the
30 William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REv.
1275, 1349 (2002); Chris Quick, Old Boy Networks Are Alive and Kicking Despite New Rules,
TIMES OF LONDON, Mar. 13; 2003, at 31.
31 See id.
32 See ROLE OF DiREcroRs REPORT, supra note 21, at 51-52.
33 See id.
34 See id. at 51.
35 See Sanjay Paul, Scandals a Painful Reminder: CEOs Are Human, GREEN BAY PREss-
GAZETrE, Jul. 11, 2002, at 9C.
36 SeeJennings, supra note 20, at 200.
37 See NACD REPORT, supra note 12, at 10.
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relationships they had with company management created a comfort
level that made it possible for them to explain away or to miss com-
pletely the various warning signs before them. Their lack of indepen-
dence did not necessarily make them bad actors, only much less
sensitive ones. They were proximate monitors, but without indepen-
dence from the management they were responsible for monitoring,
they were wholly ineffective.
The failings of Enron's directors, however, should not suggest
that proximate monitors can never be effective, or that reliance on
the "objective" outside monitor is more appropriate. They failed not
because of their proximity, but because of their lack of independence.
Had they been both truly independent from management, and signifi-
cant equity holders in the company, the Enron tale might have had a
less dramatic and devastating conclusion. The lesson of Enron is not
that proximate monitors are generally ineffective. Rather, it is that for
proximate monitors to be inspired and to successfully protect share-
holder value, they must have both independence and substantial eq-
uity holdings. Only then will we have created the kind of
management monitoring that inspires public confidence and invest-
ment in the corporate enterprise.
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